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Legislatures are arenas where diverse policy preferences are honed into 
practical policy proposals. Given that legislative membership is a result of 
free democratic elections, there is an assumption that the attitudes and 
opinions of MPs are representative of the population as a whole. Thus, pre-
legislative bargaining is founded on an unbiased sample of public opinion. 
However, considerable opinion incongruence exists between citizens and the 
political elite in many systems, potentially undermining this ideal democratic 
starting point for legislative business. Candidate-centred voting systems 
offer the potential to remedy this disconnect. While citizens tend to 
emphasise personal characteristics as an explanation for vote choice in one 
of the most candidate-centred systems in existence, PR-STV, the disconnect 
of opinion congruence between citizens and elites persists. This paper finds 
that citizens’ emphasis on MPs’ personal characteristics when choosing 
representatives causes significant opinion congruence between citizens and 
elites on a demographic basis, particularly for under-represented groups 
such as the women, younger citizens and those from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds, but aggregate congruence is undermined by the lack of 
demographic diversity among MPs.  
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Introduction 
Parliamentary democracy assumes that a sufficiently diverse geographic 
distribution of legislators will produce a parliamentary membership that, on 
aggregate, is representative of public opinion. Compromises can then be 
considered from this distribution of opinion until practical legislative 
proposals are constructed. Proportional electoral systems (PR) aim to 
achieve this maximisation of opinion by awarding more seats in parliament 
to parties with small national or constituency vote shares than would be the 
case in a non-PR systems (Blais and Bodet, 2006; Cox, 1997; Katz, 1997; 
Lijphart, 1994). PR systems lack the centripetal pressure on parties 
ideological positions, allowing them to explicitly advocate minority opinions 
                                                          
1 This is an Author’s Original Manuscript. Please cite using  
Courtney, Michael. 2016. ‘Social Background and Citizen-Legislator Congruence in 
Candidate-Centred Systems’ The Journal of Legislative Studies 22(3): 329-348. 
 
2 
 
while minimising electoral costs (Mitchell, 2006). When PR systems are 
candidate-centred, emphasis on personal characteristics can override 
citizens’ party considerations, particularly under PR-STV where these 
considerations are not mutually exclusive (Marsh, 2007; Carey and Shugart 
1995).  
This paper examines attitudinal congruence under PR-STV between 
Irish citizens2 and elites at the system and individual levels. The purpose is 
to determine whether or not the candidate-centred nature of the system is 
likely to aid policy congruence between citizens and legislators. Moreover, 
can any incongruence at the system level can be explained by the under-
representation of descriptive groups? The paper begins by discussing the 
theoretical importance of the question and the expectations for the analysis. 
It then presents the Comparative Candidate and Irish National Election 
surveys data and the proposed analytic method. The results in the subsequent 
section show that congruence is highest between citizens and MPs with an 
occupational background in farming, the lower-socioeconomic classes, the 
young, and females. It is lowest for those from rural backgrounds and the 
over-40s. Though there may be significant congruence on a demographic 
basis, the homogeneity of candidates and legislators’ social backgrounds 
causes the system to fall short of its potential for attitude congruence. The 
implication is that raising the participation of under-represented groups will 
increase policy congruence between citizens and legislators. This needs to be 
addressed at the level of the parties themselves. 
 
The Irish party system has been a puzzling case in political science 
for decades due to a lack of a left-right foundation for inter-party 
competition, as is commonly found elsewhere. In Ireland, there is typically 
more attitude variation within parties than between them and the party 
system is a European outlier in this regard (Courtney, 2015). However, the 
Irish political elite conform to international trends in that they are not 
demographically representative of the Irish population (Weeks, 2011). If it 
transpires that descriptive representation (Phillips, 1995) doesn’t matter in 
this case, it is unlikely to matter anywhere. The high level of volatility in the 
2011 election (Mair, 2011) also minimises the eﬀect of party identiﬁcation 
on vote choice. Coming in the wake of the economic crisis, citizens, 
particularly Fianna Fáil citizens (Marsh and Mikhaylov, 2012), threw oﬀ the 
shackles of party loyalties which had endured for decades allowing a more 
rational focus on the competence of the candidates and parties.  
 
2.0 Attitudes, Congruence and Descriptive Representation 
Attitudes are theoretically important to political science not simply because 
they represent a salient opinion that diﬀerentiate one party or MP3 from 
                                                          
2 While it is tempting to use the term ‘citizens’ to describe the respondents to the 
Irish National Election Survey, we cannot assume that every respondent actually 
voted. The mass level will therefore be referred to as ‘citizens’ throughout. 
3 Members of the lower house of parliament in Ireland are referred to as Teachta 
Dála (TD). Throughout this paper they will be referred to as ‘members of 
parliament’ or MP. 
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political competitors, but also because attitudes are an intervening variable 
which complete the causal bridge between other important concepts, namely 
political socialisation and policy outputs. It is established in the 
psychological literature that attitudes at the individual level are a product of 
socialisation experiences (Allport, 1935). The complication arises in 
attempting to establish whether a broad demographic category such as 
gender can be associated with political attitude distinctions or whether 
socialisation and attitude formation processes are too idiosyncratic to be 
modelled in any meaningful way. Moreover, the link between any 
socialisation experiences and attitudes potentially weakens when a 
distinction is made between aﬀective attitudes and those that have more 
cognitive and behavioural implications (Fishbein and Azjen, 1975; Bishin, 
2006). For example, an MP might hold a positive aﬀective attitude towards 
the idea that wealth inequality should be minimised but in turn disagree with 
raising taxes on the rich, either because it might cause “capital ﬂight” and 
undermine the economy (cognitive), or because they know their party might 
not be receptive to the idea and ultimately whip the individual into voting 
against such proposals (behavioural). From this psychological starting point 
it can be inferred that if there is a deficit of  socialisation experiences among 
members of parliament they will inadequately reflect the attitudes of society.  
 Candidate-centred systems give citizens the opportunity to 
emphasise demographic characteristics when casting their vote, potentially 
maximising systemic attitude congruence. This is because politicians have a 
rational incentive to distinguish themselves from intra-party competitors by 
developing a personal following (Marsh, 2007; Carey and Shugart, 1995). 
Thus, an examination of the relationship between the social background 
characteristics and congruence in a highly candidate-centred system is 
appropriate.  
 
2.1 System-level congruence 
One ideal of democracy is that parliaments should begin their deliberations 
with an unbiased distribution of public opinion (Marsh, 1980). The debate on 
sufficient representation takes Pitkin’s (1967) standard of acting in a manner 
responsive to citizens as a starting point. This means government’s enacting 
legislation which is supported by the majority of the population (Page and 
Shapiro, 1983). However, legislation is an output measure of representation 
and falls short of the input ideal outlined by philosophers such as J.S. Mill 
(Gray and Smith, 2012; Miller, 2010), who argued that representation is 
improved by greater participation across social classes. Recently, it has been 
found that countries with proportional electoral systems tend to elect more 
congruent legislatures than those in majoritarian systems (Golder and 
Stramski, 2010)4. In Sweden, representatives hold preferences for higher 
                                                          
4 However, Golder and Stramski also show that there are no diﬀerences in 
congruence across the two system types on congruence between citizens and the 
government. Moreover, an earlier study (Blais and Bodet, 2006) showed that PR 
increases the distance between voters and parties, while showing that the 
government also tended to be congruent with voters. 
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levels of public spending than citizens (Ågren et al, 2007), while in Portugal 
citizens and MPs were more congruent on specific issue items than the more 
abstract left-right self-placement question (Freire and Belchior, 2013). 
Moreover, while Belchior (2010) found that MPs across Europe tend to be 
more ideologically extreme than citizens, parties within each system are 
fairly responsive to the electorate. Belchior states here that citizens’ and 
elites’ responses to survey questions are not entirely conceptually 
comparable, as the latter are more precise. Moreover, despite Belchior’s 
content with citizen-elite distances as measured in the paper, she also states 
that it is worth comparing citizen and elite attitudes if better data are 
available5.  
With reference to how voting behaviour in Ireland is influenced by 
the candidate-centred nature of the system, Marsh (2007, pg. 503) provides 
evidence that candidates rather than parties are key to vote choice in Ireland. 
This presents a dilemma though as he states that  
 “it makes little sense to look for reasons why a particular citizen 
 supported a party if that citizen was rather supporting a particular 
 candidate and would have done so whatever that candidate’s 
 party label.” 
But Marsh (2007, pg. 505) goes on to that state party and candidate 
preferences 
 “are not necessarily exclusive: citizens may vote on 
 locality, for instance, but do so within parties, picking the candidates    
             of a preferred party according to how close their base is to the 
 citizen’s own area.” 
Thus, the operationalization of PR with STV in Ireland potentially permits a 
comparatively high level of congruence between citizens and legislators if 
citizens first choose a party that is closest to them, and then pick the 
legislator within that party that is closest to them. As Marsh points out, this 
sophisticated level of voting requires information. Based on the relationship 
between socialisation and attitudes outlined above, and descriptive and 
substantive representation theory outlined below, the assumption of this 
paper is that demographic characteristics provides this information by proxy 
if it is not readily available. 
The ﬁrst hypothesis to be tested is the extent to which the broad 
distributions of citizen and elite opinion are congruent. This is the system-
level hypothesis, to be followed by the individual-level hypothesis below. 
 
H1: The distributions of citizens’ and MPs’ attitudes systematically 
differ. 
 
It is also necessary to consider issue salience (Jones and Baumgartner, 
2004). The extent to which citizen-elite congruence matters at all may be 
dependent on the extent to which the issues being debated are of any 
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Irish opposition party at the time, Fine Gael. 
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significant level of importance to citizens. Assessing congruence would be a 
moot exercise if the issues on which congruence is achieved have very 
limited political implications. Salience may vary across issues (Page and 
Shapiro, 1983) as policies that aﬀect citizens individually, such as taxation 
levels, may be more salient than policies which have collective beneﬁts but 
individual costs, such as protecting the environment. Thus, the preferences 
of citizens and elites may be more congruent on issues which citizens are 
more interested in and are subject to higher levels of public discussion. 
However, preferences may vary between citizens and elites purely due to 
elites being more sensitive to the dynamics of policy-making and the eﬀects 
of changes in policy (Page and Bouton, 2006). Taking mass-elite linkages 
and salience into account leads to an addendum hypothesis to the ﬁrst. 
 
H1a: Congruence varies across items by salience. 
 
2.2 Individual-level congruence 
It is expected that the membership of the Irish parliament does not reflect the 
views of the electorate owing to the under-representation of descriptive 
groups among MPs. If the relationship between socialisation and attitudes is 
correct, representatives’ attitudes are primarily informed by their own 
personal experiences rather than an elastic conversation with the electorate. 
The prominent thesis in descriptive representation studies is Anne Phillips’s 
The Politics of Presence (1995). Where Pitkin’s (1967) standard for 
sufficient representation is merely ‘responsiveness’, Phillips sets a higher 
standard by arguing that substantive representation is dependent on 
descriptive representation. When legislators are drawn from a narrow social 
pool, the range of policy considerations is similarly limited. Many of 
society’s diverse views and attitudes are automatically excluded from the 
deliberative process on account of the absence or under-representation of 
certain groups in parliament and parties. Phillips (1995) is referring here to 
the exclusion of women, minority ethnic groups and any groups that that 
have come to see themselves as marginalized, silenced or excluded. Phillips 
argues the most self-evident case is that of women’s representation. Women 
make up ﬁfty per cent of society yet typically make up a much smaller 
proportion of parliamentarians. As will be discussed further below, women 
have been shown to have significantly different issue priorities and 
preferences than men. Thus, congruence depends on legislators sharing the 
socialisation experiences of citizens.  
Descriptive representation can have further democratic benefits 
beyond the heightened likelihood of advancing salient substantive interests. 
Mansbridge (1999) argues that political interests may not be crystallised on 
every issue at the point that citizens authorise the representative to act on 
their behalf. In this context, the best way to have one’s most important 
substantive interests represented is often to choose a representative whose 
descriptive characteristics match one’s own. Then, as issues arise 
unpredictably, a citizen can expect the representative to react more or less 
the way the citizen would have done due to descriptive similarity. Female 
legislators have typically been the ones to bring issues of sexual harassment 
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and violence against women to the forefront of the political sphere, 
particularly when these issues had not been crystallised by the two main 
parties in the United States. Mansbridge (1999) highlights the case of Illinois 
Commission on the Status of Women. Here a bipartisan legislative group, 
comprised entirely of women, proposed a bill of measures which, foremost 
among them, instituted the crime of rape in marriage. Mansbridge asserts 
that this descriptive eﬀect on substantive issues has been evident in 
legislature after legislature. We can therefore expect that congruence will be 
high between citizens and elites with shared social backgrounds even on 
issues which have not been extensively discussed in public. A positive 
ﬁnding would also provide support for aﬃrmative action measures to 
diversify the membership of the political elite in Ireland and elsewhere.  
There is further comparative evidence of attitudinal variation among 
elites being related to socio-demographic characteristics. Generally, female 
and young MPs are found to be more left-wing, socially liberal and feminist 
than their male counterparts (Welch, 1985; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995; 
Narud and Valen, 2000; Wängnerud, 2000a; Wängnerud, 2000b)6. Though 
gender imbalance in legislatures is a more obvious representation gap, 
occupational class may be more important. The descriptive representation of 
occupational class was relevant in the US Congress (Carnes 2012) and Latin 
America (Carnes and Lupu 2015), as lawmakers from the different classes 
bring different economic attitudes to the legislative process. Similar class 
effects were observed in the Nordic countries (Narud and Valen, 2000) but 
not in the UK (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995).  
There is less evidence of demographic congruence in the form being 
tested in this paper. Converse and Pierce (1986) found that French MPs were 
congruent with citizens of similar educational attainment. Across the Nordic 
countries, male MPs consistently represented the views of male citizens, but 
the evidence was mixed for a similar relationship between female MPs and 
female citizens (Narud and Valen, 2000). Rosset (2013) finds that Swiss 
MPs are less in favour of state intervention in the economy, with relatively 
poor citizens being less well represented than citizens with high incomes. 
Ågren et al (2007) find that attitudes vary among citizens and elites by 
gender, age and education level, but this dynamic does not explain the 
overall mass-elite incongruence. For  Portugal, Freire and Belchior (2013) 
found that citizens of lower occupational status place themselves more to the 
left on the left-right scale than citizens of higher occupational status, though 
there is no comparable data for elites in this case. This literature leads to the 
ﬁnal hypothesis: 
 
H2: Citizens and elites who share social background characteristics 
are attitudinally congruent. 
 
3. Data and Method 
                                                          
6 This evidence is challenged in a previous study of the Irish case with a reverse 
ﬁnding of female conservatism within the Irish parties (O’Sullivan, 2002). 
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The analysis presented here is built on citizen and elite survey data 
conducted in the wake of the 2011 Irish General Election. These are the Irish 
National Election Survey 2011 (INES) (N = 1843) and the Comparative 
Candidate Survey 2011, Ireland (CCS) (Response Rate = 42%, N = 249 of 
which NMP = 75 and NDEFEATEDCANDIDATE = 174)7. The distributions of party 
affiliations and demographics are broadly similar between the full 
membership of the parliament and respondents to the CCS survey. Table 1. 
below compares the proportion of survey respondents by party affiliation 
and demographics to the full population of TDs. While the Irish case is un-
typical in terms of being a system dominated by two centre-right parties, it is 
quite typical in terms of elite composition. Upper class, middle-aged men are 
over-represented in the Dáil compared to their distribution in the electorate. 
In terms of social class, the upper class AB8 group are over-represented 
among politicians, at the expense of lower class C2DEs, who are typically 
low-level clerical and manual workers9.  
 
Eighteen survey items are included here covering a range of political 
issues from high salience items focused on the management of the 
economy10 to low salience social, nationalist and post-materialist items11. 
These items use a range of response criteria from ﬁve-point and seven-point 
agree/disagree scales to 11-point (0-10) closeness scales, with opposing 
statements at each extreme point. In order to keep the interpretation of 
statistical coeﬃcients consistent across all of the items within the tables 
below, all items were rescaled so that the mid-point lies at zero and items on 
a 7-point or 5-point scales were normalised to range between -5 and + 512. 
                                                          
7 For the purpose of this paper the analysis does not include respondents from the 
CCS who were unsuccessful, thus bringing elected MPs into clear focus. 
8 The class scheme used in this paper broadly maps onto those used by survey 
companies and Marsh et al. (2008). The AB category collapses two categories, a and 
B, and refers to upper professionals such as doctors, lawyers and managers. The C1 
category is lower professionals and refers to the likes of middle managers and 
teachers. The C2DE category collapses three categories from low-level 
administrators to semi-skilled and unskilled workers. There are very elites in this 
study that fall into the this broad low-class category. A category code for Farmers is 
also included. 
9 The urban/rural divide is institutionally set, but a dichotomous control variable is 
included, where 0 is urban representative and 1 rural indicates a rural representative, 
as geographical background type may have a strong inﬂuence on their attitudes 
(Miller and Stokes, 1963; Fenno, 1978; Converse and Pierce, 1986) 
10 These include left-right self-placement, taxation, privatisation, regulation and 
mortgage relief for highly-indebted homeowners, whether citizens should get a fair 
share of the nation’s wealth and whether it is ok for some people to be a lot richer 
than others.. 
11 These include restricting immigration, two items on environmental protection, EU 
integration, re-unification of the island of Ireland as one political entity, gender 
quotas for political parties, the effect of more women in politics on ethical standards, 
working women’s relationship with their children, reducing the number of MPs, 
belief in God, whether it is better to have religious people in public. 
12 This is similar to the approach taken by Blaydes and Linzer (2012), who rescaled 
items so that all values lie between 0 and 1. My modiﬁcation simply makes the table 
coeﬃcients, particularly the party intercept terms, more easily interpretable. 
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Negative numbers represent economically left-wing, socially liberal attitudes 
or the best interpretation of such.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of the independent 
variables between the full membership of the 
Dáil and the CCS sample 
Categories 
Full 
Dáil 
CCS 
sample 
Party-level 
Fine Gael  0.45 0.39 
Labour 0.23 0.26 
Fianna Fáil  0.12 0.13 
Sinn Féin 0.08 0.06 
ULA 0.04 0.03 
Other 0.08 0.13 
Gender 
Male 0.84 0.78 
Female 0.16 0.22 
Age 
Age 18-39 0.20 0.19 
Age 40-59 0.54 0.58 
Age 60+ 0.26 0.23 
Education 
Less than University 
Education 0.30 0.27 
University Education 0.70 0.73 
Social class 
Class AB 0.51 0.61 
Class C1 0.29 0.24 
Class C2DE 0.10 0.08 
Farmer 0.10 0.07 
Constituency type 
Urban 0.35 0.38 
Rural  0.65 0.62 
N 166 75 
      
Values are the proportion of respondents in the 
column/sub-category. Each column/sub-category 
sums to one. 
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To take issue salience into account I follow Marsh et al. (2008)’s 
approach for the INES survey13. The survey asked citizen respondents the 
question; ‘What has been the issue most (and second most) important to you 
personally in this election?’ While the CCS asked ‘In your opinion, what are 
the three most important political problems facing Ireland today?’ The 
results are summarised in Table 2. below in order of citizen priority 
according to a broad categorical type across citizens and MPs. The economy 
is the overwhelming issue with about three quarters of both groups 
mentioning an item which has implications for the government’s policies on 
economic management. The second most mentioned item type was political 
reform, although the drop-oﬀ in mentions is considerable with only 14 
percent of citizens and 8 percent of MPs mentioning an item that has 
implications for political reform. These tended to be focused on emotions 
such as anger at, trust in, and perceived corruption among, public 
representatives. Two of the most relatively salient issues of political reform 
during the 2011 election were reducing the number of MPs and a drive to 
implement quotas for female party candidates (Gallagher and Marsh, 2011). 
Attitudes to these items were measured in the surveys. Immigration, the 
environment and EU integration are extremely low salience issues with 1 per 
cent or less of mentions across both groups. 
Table 1. Issue Salience among Voters and MPs 
Issue % Mentions 
Voters TDs 
Job creation 25 33 
Economic Management 16 18 
Problems with the banks/Banking crisis 10 8 
Anger with the government 10 - 
Health services 9 5 
Deficit in the public finances 7 13 
IMF/EU bailout 6 4 
Social spending cuts 4 - 
Taxation 3 
Education/Local Schools 3 1 
Stable government 2 - 
Political Reform 2 6 
Universal social charge 1 - 
Negative Equity 1 - 
Immigration 1 - 
The environment 0 1 
Corruption - 
Inequality 3 
Trust in public representatives 2 
N  1650 75 
 
                                                          
13 This approach is criticised by Wlezien (2005) who argues the most appropriate 
way to measure salience is ask citizens to rank a prepared list of issues. Other 
inferential methods of assessing the salience of issues such as the lowest percentage 
of ‘don’t know’ responses to each item (Page and Shapiro, 1983). 
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Confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to determine the extent to 
which items load onto one of five latent variables assumed a priori14. An 
overall left-right variable incorporates all of the items and a “second 
dimension” item (GAL/TAN15 and feminism) combines all of the non-
economic variables. These factor analyses are conducted on MPs’ responses 
as elite attitudes tend to be more highly structured and to prevent 
dependence in the following stage, which is to predict MPs’ and citizens’ 
positions on these latent factors. The factors which emerge from the MP 
analysis are forced for the citizens using the same items, even if this factor 
does not strictly exist according to an independent factor analysis of citizen 
attitudes.  
The first stage of the analysis addresses the J.S. Mill question as to 
whether the distribution of opinion in the legislature is broadly congruent 
with public opinion. It uses simple Kolmogorov-Smirnoﬀ (KS) tests of 
distribution diﬀerences to determine the level of congruence (Golder and 
Stramski, 2010) between citizens and MPs. This test is performed for the 
overall distributions of citizens and MPs and between subsets of citizens and 
MPs identified by social background characteristics. While the KS tests of 
all respondents has potentially N = 1928 before NAs are excluded, the KS 
tests comparing male MPs and male citizens has N = 985 and the test 
comparing female citizens with female MPs has N = 943. These Ns continue 
to vary depending on the distributions of citizens and MPs under each social 
background categorisation. The KS test statistic reports the distance (D) 
between the two distributions being compared in each test. We can interpret 
the significance of the statistic for inferential purposes by examining the 
significance of the p-value. That is, for every accepted threshold of 
significance we declare that distributions are further apart. A p-value of less 
than 0.05 indicates that the distributions are two standard deviations apart. A 
p-value of less than 0.01 indicates three standard deviations of difference 
and less than 0.001 indicates four standard deviations of difference. 
Variations in D statistics with p > 0.05 and D variations not associated with 
variation in statistical significance are assumed to be random and the null 
hypothesis of inter-group equality is accepted. 
For the purpose of this paper, congruence can be defined at different 
levels. First, overall congruence can exist between citizens and elites. 
Second, congruence can be achieved between sub-categories of demographic 
groups such as female citizens and  female MPs. Third, a subcategory of 
MPs can be significantly incongruent with survey respondents who share 
their characteristics, but closer to these respondents than their comparator 
sub-category. Thus, female MPs may not be congruent with female citizens, 
                                                          
14 The economic index, the post-materialist GAL/TAN index and a feminism index 
are assumed to be independent. 
 
15 An interpretation of the ‘second dimension’ constructed by Hooghe et al (2002) 
with the letters standing for Green, Alternative, Libertarian, Traditional, 
Authoritarian, Nationalist. Courtney (2015) demonstrates that the grouping of 
nationalism on the right of this dimension is somewhat inappropriate in the Irish 
case, so the results should be treated cautiously. 
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but they may be one or more standard deviations closer to female citizens 
than male MPs are to male citizens (hereafter, the better-than-comparator 
test). Fourth, a sub-category of MPs may be further from citizens than their 
comparator, but closer than overall congruence. If there was three standard 
deviations between citizens and MPs generally, two standard deviations 
between males citizens and MPs, and one standard deviation or less between 
female citizens and MPs, the males would be said to have achieved better-
than-all congruence and females better than-comparator congruence. 
 In the second stage of the analysis the overall level of congruence by 
background category is inferred in two ways. The first runs the tests on 
predicted scores from the factor analysis. The second calculates a 
representation score at the item level with weighted sums of the number of 
items which achieve congruence. Three representation scores are calculated. 
The first (R1) is weighted in favour of the number of items for which full 
congruence (C) on each demographic sub-category is achieved by dividing 
the better-than-comparator items (BTC) by two and dividing  the better-than-
all (BTA) values by three. The second (R2) removes the weight on the better-
than-all count and only divides the better-than-comparator by 2. The third 
(R3) applies no weights. The number of items for which overall congruence 
(A) was achieved is subtracted from the count for the individual categories. 
The scores are simply  
 
R1 = (C + (BTC/2) + (BTA/3)) - A 
R2 = (C + BTC + (BTA/2) - A 
R3 = (C + BTC + BTA) - A 
 
Where C is the sum of items where the p-value of the D statistic in a KS test 
is greater than 0.05, indicating no significant difference in attitudes between 
the groups. BTC is the better-than-comparator count, BTA is the better-than-
all count and A is the count of items for which overall congruence is 
achieved. 
 
4.0 Analysis 
 
4.1 Factor Congruence 
This section discusses the extent to which items load onto hypothesised 
factors and the extent of congruence between citizens and MPs on these 
factors. Confirmatory factor analysis is conducted for five factors among the 
MPs. The eigenvalues for each hypothesised factor determine whether the 
factor exist in the data. Eigenvalues of greater than one demonstrate that a 
clear factor exists. In these tests all of the values for each of the factors are 
greater than one. Thus, a general left-right factor exists which underlies all 
of the data (e = 3.164). An economic factor binds responses to economic 
items (e = 2.658), though the eigenvalue is lower than the ‘all items’ factor. 
The eigenvalues for the second dimension (e = 1.566) and the GAL/TAN (e 
= 1.746) dimension are equally lower again but still above the acceptable 
threshold while the feminist factor (e = 1.081) is the lowest but acceptable 
also. Figure 1. illustrates the variation in eigenvalues for various numbers of 
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factors within the economic items. There is one clear factor as the 
eigenvalues drop off dramatically after the first factor. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Factor Analysis of Economic Items 
 
 
 Attitudes are predicted along these factors for citizens and MPs 
separately. A series of KS tests are then presented that compare citizens and 
MPs as described in section 3 above. Table 3 below presents the results of 
testing the relationship between citizen and MPs attitude distributions with, 
and without, social background distinctions for each factor variable. Each 
cell in the table is a KS test for distribution differences accompanied by their 
standard error.  
Table 2. Voter-MP Congruence on Factor Variables by Social Background 
Social Background All Economy 2nd Dimension GAL/TAN Feminism 
D SE D SE D SE D SE D SE 
All 0.65*** 0.00 0.71*** 0.00 0.36*** 0.00 0.54*** 0.00 0.78*** 0.00 
Male 0.70*** 0.00 0.75*** 0.00 0.37*** 0.00 0.59*** 0.00 0.84*** 0.00 
Female 0.48** 0.00 0.57*** 0.00 0.3 0.12 0.41* 0.01 0.72*** 0.00 
Over 40 0.59*** 0.00 0.70*** 0.00 0.29*** 0.00 0.52*** 0.00 0.76*** 0.00 
Under 40 0.88*** 0.00 0.81*** 0.00 0.74*** 0.00 0.59*** 0.00 0.90*** 0.00 
Secondary Education 0.64*** 0.00 0.8*** 0.00 0.38*** 0.00 0.64*** 0.00 0.81*** 0.00 
University Education 0.69*** 0.00 0.68*** 0.00 0.37*** 0.00 0.52*** 0.00 0.77*** 0.00 
Class: AB 0.70*** 0.00 0.77*** 0.00 0.38*** 0.00 0.63*** 0.00 0.77*** 0.00 
Class: C1 0.63*** 0.00 0.61*** 0.00 0.3 0.09 0.43** 0.00 0.84*** 0.00 
Class: C2DE 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.11 0.41 0.26 0.85*** 0.00 
Class: Farmer 1.00*** 0.00 1.00*** 0.00 0.81*** 0.00 0.96*** 0.00 1.00*** 0.00 
Urban 0.55*** 0.00 0.62*** 0.00 0.25 0.15 0.44*** 0.00 0.77*** 0.00 
Rural 0.69*** 0.00 0.75*** 0.00 0.38*** 0.00 0.58*** 0.00 0.79*** 0.00 
                      
Coefficients are D statistics from Kolmorgorov-Smirnoff tests for distribution differences. Standard errors in right-
adjacent cells. Statistical significance indicates incongruence of attitudes to the extent *** p < 0. 001, ** p < 0.01 
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and * p < 0.05. 
  
The first thing to note is that incongruence is the norm rather than 
the exception. Thus, most coefficients indicate that citizens and MPs hold 
significantly different attitudes to most of these issues. This is not what we 
expect for a political system that allows citizens to interact party and 
personal characteristics when formulating their vote choice. In the ‘All’ row, 
the entire sample of citizens is compared to the sample of MPs. The D 
statistic indicates highly significant distance between both groups for all 
items. The D statistic is highest on the economic dimension and lowest on 
the 2nd dimension though this variation is random as p–values are equivalent. 
As the dominant demographic group in the gender category, it is no 
surprise that the preferences of male MPs is driving overall incongruence 
from citizens. But what is surprising is that the comparison of male MPs 
with male citizens mirrors the overall incongruence so closely. We might 
have expected to see more variation given that women make up 50% of the 
citizen sample. The representation of female citizens by female MPs is 
somewhat of an improvement on the comparable male relationship. 
Although female MPs are significantly incongruent with female citizens on 
the ‘All’ variable, they are one standard deviation of statistical significance 
closer to male citizens than male MPs. This is being driven by the complete 
congruence on the second dimension, which includes all of the GAL/TAN 
and feminism items. When split into separate factors, congruence is not as 
impressive.  
The class category also highlights a similarly interesting dynamic. 
The C2DE category includes all individuals with the lowest-skill 
occupational backgrounds. They are also severely under-represented in 
national politics. Complete congruence is achieved between citizens and 
MPs in this category on all factor variations except the feminism item. 
Moreover, the higher skill C1s also achieve complete congruence on the 
second dimension and C1 MPs are closer to C1 citizens on the GAL/TAN 
factor than the over-represented ABs. Farmers are almost completely 
incongruent with farming citizens on each of these factors. Geography is a 
source of congruence for urban citizens and MPs on the 2nd dimension. 
      
4.3 Item Congruence  
With some MP groups containing as few as five (farmers) and six (C2DEs) 
observations, the inference from aggregated factor variables may not convey 
the whole picture. Indeed , Freire and Belchior (2013) found that congruence 
was higher for substantive issue items in the Portuguese case. The 
congruence patterns are described here on an item-by-item basis. It is also 
the case here that the overall distributions for citizen and MPs self placement 
on the affective left-right scale are incongruent (D = 0.41, p < 0.001) while 
their respective attitudes to the cognitive item of privatisation do not differ. 
The results of all the statistical tests are summarised in Table 4 below.  
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Table 3. Social Background Congruence across Items 
Variable Category R1 R2 R3 
Class Farmer 11.5 12 12 
Class C2DE 10.5 12 12 
Age Under 40 9.83 12.5 13 
Class C1 6 8 8 
Education Secondary 5.83 7.5 8 
Gender Female 5.33 7.5 8 
Geography Urban 5 7 7 
- All 5 5 5 
Education University 4 4.5 6 
Class AB 4 5 5 
Gender Male 3.5 5 5 
Age Over 40 1.5 2 2 
Geography Rural 1.33 1.5 2 
 
The striking finding here is that farmers are the top category for congruence, 
contrary to the factor analysis-based test above. Demographic congruence is 
achieved on 11 items for which overall congruence is not. Indeed, on only 
two items, environmental protection and reducing the number of MPs, are 
farming citizens and MPs incongruent. The next pattern to note is that the 
demographic categories achieving higher representation scores are those that 
are severely under-represented in politics; individuals from lower socio-
economic and educational classes, young people and women. These 
categories have higher representation scores than the ‘All’ category. 
However, it is not a deterministic outcome that the over-represented groups 
should have lower scores than the ‘All’ category. ‘All’ could have been the 
lowest scoring group with each demographic achieving high congruence 
with their comparable citizens. Nonetheless it seems that congruence is 
lower than ‘All’ for these groups, perhaps because their attitudes represent a 
mid-way point between their own demographic among citizens and the rival 
demographic. Thus, women MPs may be closer to women citizens than male 
MPs to male citizens because male MPs represent the middle ground 
between male and female citizens. This should be investigated in future 
research. 
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Table 4. Congruence by Item and Salience 
Item Category R1 R2 R3 
Working women can have the same relationship  
with their children as women who stay at home Feminism 12 12 12 
Gender Quota should be introduced for political parties Feminism 11 11 11 
State assets should be privatised Economy 10 10 10 
Government should raise taxes and increase spending Economy 10 10 10 
The British Government should withdraw from Northern Ireland GAL/TAN 8 8 8 
The environment should be protected even if this affects  
economic growth GAL/TAN 8 8 8 
I would accept a cut in living standards to protect the environment GAL/TAN 8 8 8 
God definitely exists GAL/TAN 7.33 7.5 8 
State and industry should be regulated by the state Economy 7 7 7 
EU Integration should be pushed further GAL/TAN 6.5 7 7 
Immigration should be reduced GAL/TAN 5.83 7.5 8 
Citizens should get their fair share of a nation’s wealth Economy 5 8 8 
It is ok for some people to be a lot richer than others Economy 5 5 5 
Politics would improve if more women were elected Feminism 4.5 7 7 
The government should assist people in mortgage difficulty Economy 3.5 5 5 
The number of MPs should be reduced Reform 3 3 3 
Left-Right Self-Placement Economy 2.5 3 3 
It is better to have more people with religious belief 
in public office. GAL/TAN 1.5 2 2 
  
 
 
In section 2.1 we discussed how items might vary depending on the broader 
issue area they are associated with. Table 5. evaluates the importance of 
salience in achieving congruence. Items associated with high salience 
concepts such as economic performance should be associated with higher 
levels of congruence. The table above calculates a representation score by 
summing the number of background variables for which congruence was 
achieved on each item. If an item achieved overall congruence but sub-
categories of demographics were incongruent, these counts were subtracted 
from the score. The dimensions are coded for economic left-right, 
GAL/TAN, feminist and political reform items. Thus, some items for which 
overall congruence was achieved, and demographic categories were 
incongruent with each other, have negative values.  
 There is no clear overall pattern to the representative scores for each 
item when grouped by ideological dimension. There is a slightly higher 
likelihood for the feminist and GAL/TAN dimension to achieve high levels 
of congruence between demographic groups. Although, this is some support 
for H1a, the evidence demonstrates almost random variation in congruence 
by issue area. It does demonstrate that congruence is higher between 
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demographic groups on issues that are not as routinely discussed during Irish 
elections, particularly the Irish general election of 2011. This supports 
Mansbridge’s (1999) claim that descriptive groups can represent the 
preferences of people who share their descriptive characteristics on issues 
where those preferences have not been as clearly communicated as on other 
issues. However, given that overall congruence was achieved on the specific 
high salience items, privatisation and taxation, means that congruence is 
quite high on the economic dimension also.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The objective this paper is to assess whether congruence exists between 
citizens and representatives on the basis of shared social background. The 
candidate-centred feature of the Irish electoral system provides an 
opportunity to assess the extent to which the electoral system can facilitate 
political attitude congruence.  The paper has gone beyond overall levels of 
congruence between institutionally-defined groups, to assess whether 
congruence varies depending on shared social background characteristics of 
citizens and elites. This has implications for our theoretical understanding of 
representation as party labels may not sufficiently represent citizens’ 
opinions in a manner consistent with our evolving democratic standards. 
Party affiliation may be the primary basis of the institutional relationship, 
but biased distributions of social background characteristics among 
representatives may be under-mining the degree to which the views of 
under-represented groups are expressed in parliamentary deliberations. 
 The paper has found some support for the hypotheses put forward in 
section 2. For the most part, H1 is rejected. More often than not, MPs’ views 
differ significantly from citizens. This demonstrates that there are limits to 
which the permissiveness of the electoral system for vote choice can 
facilitate ideological congruence. However, congruence is achieved on two 
high salience items, taxation and privatisation. Perhaps congruence is not a 
problem if representatives are responsive to the issues of most importance to 
citizens? Although the analysis of salience (H1a) does not provide clear 
patterns, in quantity terms the feminist and GAL/TAN items tend to be 
clustered towards the top. This indicates that social background congruence 
tends to be associated with items on which attitudes are not clearly 
communicated in a noisy election campaign. Thus, social background 
congruence is more important for low salience issues.  
The main focus of this paper (H2) has some significant support. 
Under-represented groups such as women and low-skilled citizens have 
higher attitudinal congruence with representatives who share their life 
experiences than over-represented groups do with their representatives. 
However, groups who are in the majority at the elite level are driving the 
incongruence observed at the overall level. That the dynamics are clearer for 
specific issue items rather than factor or abstract variables is consistent with 
previous research, most significantly Freire and Belchior (2013). That 
similar inferences are drawn from another country-case beyond Portugal 
bodes well for the validity of both papers’ results.  
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The results of this paper are interesting because it means that the 
existing representatives are not exclusively representing the views of their 
own social groups, but possibly adopting a median position between their 
own groups and under-represented groups, though this directional 
speculation was not explicitly tested here. Indeed, incongruent 
representatives could be an extreme position away from all citizens. This 
should be explored in further study. Moreover, the candidate-centred nature 
of the electoral system is insufficient to ensure congruence between citizens 
and legislators. Other barriers to diverse social background representation 
must be having significant influence on delivering the biased distributions of 
demographic categories among MPs.  
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